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viewpoint
viewpoint
Never let me clone?
Countering an ethical argument against the reproductive cloning of humans
Yvette Pearson

I

n the March 2006 issue of EMBO reports,
Christof Tannert, a bioethicist at the Max
Delbrück Research Centre in Berlin,
Germany, presented a moral argument
against human reproductive cloning on the
basis of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative (Tannert, 2006). In this article, I
address some problems with Tannert’s views
and show that our concerns about this
prospective procedure should prompt us to
scrutinize carefully the conventional procreative practices and attitudes. Indeed, if
we set aside objections that are grounded in
genetic determinism, many of the offensive
features of human cloning are identical to
problems with procreation by more conventional means, including both old-fashioned
procreation and assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). Oddly enough, many see
only cloning as problematic, whereas identical problems with everyday procreation
continue to go unnoticed.
In his article, Tannert endeavours to provide us with a sound argument that human
reproductive cloning “violates our basic
moral principles”. He grounds his argument
in Immanuel Kant’s central moral principle
of respect for all humanity, which the great
philosopher formulated as: “Act so that you
treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in the person of any other, always at the
same time as an end, never as a means
only” (Kant, 1785). In essence, Kant’s principle prohibits using rational creatures—
humans—as mere instruments to attain
one’s own selfish goals. Tannert claims that
human reproductive cloning—through
somatic cell nuclear transfer or embryo
splitting—is immoral because it violates this
principle by using a human—the clone—for
egoistical purposes. However, as I demonstrate, this assertion is problematic.
Although treating people created by cloning

as mere means—for example, as organ
banks—would be morally unacceptable, it
is misleading to identify cloning itself as the
core problem. Furthermore, although Kant’s
respect for humanity is of great practical
value, it does not provide us with adequate
guidance with regard to cloning. His moral
principle clearly applies to existing people,
but it falls short in helping us to determine
whether a particular means of creating
people is morally permissible. As Deborah
Johnson explained in another context, often
“moral concepts and principles are ambiguous in their application to new technology”
(Johnson, 2005).
If we ever hope to figure out why the
prospect of human cloning, especially
reproductive cloning, is so unsettling, we
must first remove any marginal problems
that infiltrate the arguments in this debate,
including Tannert’s. First, despite his explicit
rejection of genetic determinism, Tannert
ends up appealing to it. Second, he
assumes that only selfishness and egoism
could motivate someone to pursue reproductive cloning. Third, he makes the
assumption that a cloned person would
inevitably be treated as a mere means.
Fourth, his appeal to Kant’s moral principle
fails to clarify where the line should be
drawn with respect to research cloning.

W

hen engaging in discussions
about cloning, genetic engineering or procreation, there is
a strong and prevalent tendency for arguments to become entangled in genetic
determinism. Also known as genetic
reductionism or biological determinism, it
holds that the physical and mental traits
and behaviour of an individual are ultimately determined by his or her genotype.
This myopic view fails to acknowledge
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that the physical and social environment
of an organism also has an important role
in controlling whether and how genes
interact with each other and with the
organism’s environment. Genetic determinism has dangerous implications as it
might encourage its believers to neglect
obligations towards fellow humans. For
example, an employer might conclude
that he or she has no obligation to reduce
the levels of toxic substances in the workplace, because an employee’s risk of
developing, say, cancer is solely a function
of their genes. That is, embracing genetic
determinism encourages the view that
individuals, not environmental or socioeconomic conditions, are to blame
(Proctor, 1998; de Melo-Martín, 2005).

Although treating people created
by cloning as mere means…would
be morally unacceptable, it is
misleading to identify cloning
itself as the core problem
One corollary of genetic determinism
is the mistaken view that genetic identity
is equivalent to personal identity. Yet one
of Tannert’s major arguments against
cloning is that genetic identity carries
great weight; he claims that it is wrong to
“impose the genetic identity of any individual on another” (Tannert, 2006). But it
is not clear that cloning restricts the autonomy of the clone any more than would
reproducing with one particular individual rather than another or, in the case of
ARTs, with gametes from one donor rather
than another. In both cases, we place limits on the possible genetic outcome of the
offspring, but in neither case is it clear
EMBO reports VOL 7 | NO 7 | 2006 6 5 7
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whether or precisely how these limitations have an impact on its autonomy. In
an article on the pros and cons of human
reproductive cloning, Dan Brock reminds
us that the idea of a unique identity “predates the development of modern genetics” (Brock, 1998). Along these lines,
Brock also questions the dubious concept
of a “right to a unique genotype” and suggests that the concept is incoherent, not
legitimate, and not to be taken seriously
(Brock, 1998). To place so much weight
on genetic identity is, in effect, to invoke
genetic determinism. Tannert’s claim that
cloning is wrong because it “imposes an
arbitrary restriction on the clone’s individuality and/or external determination of a
future person—and therefore violates its
autonomy” goes against his preceding
rejection of genetic determinism. If identical twins are autonomous agents despite
their shared genetic identity, there is
no good reason to think that a clone
would lack the capacity for autonomous
decision-making.

It is not clear why cloning should
be considered either more or less
arbitrary than decisions to
procreate through more
conventional means
Tannert finds it particularly problematic
that a clone, unlike offspring created
through the combination of genetic material
from two individuals, is “the result of deliberate human decision and action… and is
therefore, through this arbitrariness, an
artefact”. Although a great deal of procreation occurs ‘accidentally’, it is still the
result of some deliberate human action, be
it intercourse or several visits to an ART
clinic. It is not clear why cloning should be
considered either more or less arbitrary
than decisions to procreate through more
conventional means. The emphasis on the
means of procreation also detracts from the
more important criterion for determining
the moral permissibility of procreation,
namely, how offspring will fare once they
are born. Merely creating people by
cloning need not restrict their autonomy
any more than procreation through intercourse or ARTs. Granted, as has been
shown by cloning experiments with animals, creating humans by cloning at this
stage is likely to be disastrous for the clone;
6 5 8 EMBO reports VOL 7 | NO 7 | 2006
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it might be impossible to advance to a
point at which cloning techniques do not
present an unacceptable risk for individual
clones, women, their fetuses and/or newborns. But if these risks of physical harm
were eliminated, it is uncertain whether
cloning would constrain autonomy any
more than any other means of procreation.

T

annert claims that cloning is wrong
because “it only fulfils the selfish
interest of a creator”, but cloning
need not be motivated by either selfishness or the desire to replicate a particular
genotype. Although cloning, by definition,
means the replication of an existing genotype, the motives to do so can vary. Along
these lines, Dena Davis draws a distinction between duplicative and logistical
cloning: in the case of duplicative cloning,
“it is the genetic replication itself that is
the attraction,” whereas the primary
motive in cases of logistical cloning is to
have a child (Davis, 2001). However, the
motives for duplicative cloning are usually
on the basis of gross misconceptions about
cloning, which abound in films, television
programmes—including those that claim
to be news programmes—and sciencefiction novels (Maio, 2006). There is a
nearly universal agreement that duplicative cloning would be downright ludicrous
as well as immoral, and only those in a
state of intractable ignorance would want
to pursue it. As shown in Kazuo Ishiguro’s
novel Never Let Me Go, even fictional
characters no longer buy into genetic
determinism. For example, the narrator
Kathy H, herself a clone, makes the following observation: “Our models were an
irrelevance, a technical necessity for
bringing us into the world… It was up to
each of us to make our own lives… It is
daft to assume you’ll have the same life as
your model” (Ishiguro, 2005).
Logistical cloning, which would be a
means to circumvent obstacles to procreation that cannot be overcome by alternative methods, might therefore be morally
permissible in some rare cases. If both
partners were sterile, cloning would be
the only means for them to have a genetically related child. A woman might want
to create a genetically related child without having sex or using donated sperm.
She might find the practice of buying
gametes morally objectionable as it
allows individuals to procreate without
fulfilling any obligations towards the

child. Moreover, she might not want to
incur risks by using sperm from an anonymous donor; he might have failed to disclose important details about his medical
history, or he might pursue his desire to
have a role in the child’s life and thereby
cause legal problems and/or emotional
upheaval for the child. Another case in
which logistical cloning might be legitimate would be if the man is sterile, the
couple believes the use of third-party
gametes to be morally objectionable and
both partners want a genetic connection
to the child. Logistical cloning, assuming
it could be done without exposing women
or children to any greater risk than that by
other means of procreation, might be
morally defensible in such cases.

Although cloning, by definition,
means the replication of an
existing genotype, the motives
to do so can vary
If we accept such arguments for logistical cloning, then cloning does not necessarily mean “using one person—the
clone—as the means to fulfil the desires of
another person: the clone generator”, as
Tannert claims. If fulfilling the desires of
the procreator to have a child constitutes
an immoral use of another person, we must
also concede that a great deal of ‘natural’
procreation is immoral for the same reason. It is not at all uncommon for individuals or couples to create children to fulfil
several desires: to pass on one’s genes; to
ensure that there will be enough people to
work the farm, carry on the family business, or care for the procreators in their old
age; to produce a ‘saviour sibling’ to save
the life of an existing child; to make money,
as in cases of full surrogacy; or simply to
satisfy an inexplicable but intense desire to
have a child. Cases of creating a child for
its own sake are more the exception than
the rule, if they exist at all.
The most likely reason for creating a
child by cloning would be to carry on the
family line. Although I find it mysterious
that genetic connections are so highly
prized—often more than social relationships among individuals—there is no denying the importance accorded to genetic
ties. One of the reasons why ARTs are in
such high demand is that people want a
child who is genetically related to at least
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one member of the couple. Considering the
prevailing attitude about the importance of
genetic links, it should come as no surprise
that some individuals might be interested in
cloning themselves or a beloved family
member, living or deceased.

T

here is probably no decision of similar magnitude that is more arbitrary
than the one to have a child. On the
face of it, rationality and procreation seem
to be extremely odd bedfellows; indeed, it
is often the absence of rationality that
leads to conception. Although we might
prefer individuals to be more thoughtful
about their procreative decisions, they are
rarely criticized when such careful deliberation is absent or when their decisions
are obviously problematic.
Even if individuals do not put a great
deal of thought into procreative decisions,
they might speculate about the possible
outcomes of their actions and recognize
that these possibilities are limited. These
limitations are also arbitrary, insofar as
they are the direct consequence of choosing one particular person over the three
billion other people around the world with
whom one might have chosen to mate. In
some cases, these limitations can be disconcerting for the prospective parents or
other family members, including existing
children. If we want to construct a morally
sound objection to cloning, we must confront widely accepted procreative practices and subject them to scrutiny, lest our
objections to reproductive cloning ring
hollow. Ultimately, it seems that we must
choose between rejecting many of our
procreative practices as morally problematic or conceding that reproductive
cloning is acceptable.

On the face of it, rationality and
procreation seem to be extremely
odd bedfellows; indeed, it is often
the absence of rationality that
leads to conception
Ultimately, the means of procreation
are morally irrelevant unless they present a
significant risk to offspring or parents, particularly the mother. This is true of cloning
at present, and it is for this reason that we
should refrain from creating offspring in
this manner. But this is not to claim that
cloning is morally impermissible because

it involves using another as a mere means;
instead the claim is that it would be wrong
to create a person by cloning because that
person would probably be born in what
Joel Feinberg calls a “harmful condition”
(Feinberg, 1984).
As logistical reproductive cloning
would not automatically violate a person’s
right to self-determination or cut off a
child’s prospect of future autonomy, it is
erroneous to conclude that cloning always
constitutes using another person—the
clone—as a mere means. Setting aside circumstances under which conception is
likely to pose a risk to the offspring—for
example, if either parent carries a devastating hereditary disease—there is nothing intrinsically wrong with bringing a
person into existence by one means
instead of another. It is important to place
greater emphasis on the actual treatment
of the offspring and not how he or she
came to be; if cloning is the problem, then
not only reproductive cloning but also
research cloning is problematic. The latter
could also be construed as being used for
self-interested or selfish motives, such as
to advance the researcher’s career. But
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there is a more pressing problem related to
research cloning, to which I will now turn.

W

hen we talk about reproductive
cloning, we generally assume that
the clone will be “live and viable”
(Gogarty, 2003), and ideally, if clones were to
be created, we would want them to be live,
viable and in good health. But how should
we deal with cloned humans that are beyond
the pre-embryo stage but unlikely to become
“live and viable” offspring? These latter
beings are no more ‘people’ than are preembryos or embryos, and we therefore do not
violate their autonomy. If the entities in question are non-sentient non-people and lack
the capacity to become people who will
experience pain or suffering as a result of
having been used in cloning research,
an appeal to well-established principles,
such as the principle of respect for people

To discriminate against people
because of the manner in which
they were conceived would be as
unacceptable as discrimination
on the basis of skin colour or sex
EMBO reports VOL 7 | NO 7 | 2006 6 5 9
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or the principle of non-maleficence, is of
no help.
Although legally, in some countries, the
limit until which human embryos can be
destroyed to harvest stem cells is drawn at 14
days, it does not follow from Tannert’s argument that researchers are morally required to
stop there. In fact, given the significance
Tannert places on implanting an embryo in a
woman’s uterus, combined with his claim
that an artificial uterus would deprive an
embryo of “an essential condition for
becoming a human”, the implication is that
research on embryos or fetuses beyond 14
days would be justifiable. Clearly, if such a
being is missing a necessary condition for
becoming a person, it cannot become a person; hence, a being that develops to 40
weeks or beyond by ectogenesis would not
be protected by Kant’s principle of respect
for people. Undoubtedly, using cloned
embryos and fetuses in research would provide us with more and better information
about the efficacy and safety of cloning, and
Tannert’s view gives us no reason to refrain
from doing so. In the end, his view about
research cloning could be construed as too
permissive, and his argument provides a
great deal of ammunition for those who
advocate a ban on all types of cloning,
including therapeutic cloning.

A

lthough it might seem obvious, many
do not distinguish between cloning
and its product, which, in the case of
logistical cloning, is a child who would be
nurtured, educated and loved by its parents.
There is no good reason to think that it
would be morally permissible to treat clones
differently to the way we treat other offspring or adults. To discriminate against
people because of the manner in which they
were conceived would be as unacceptable
as discrimination on the basis of skin colour
or sex. Although such prejudices do persist,
discrimination against people created
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through ARTs is, to my knowledge, nonexistent. Various new methods of ART have
been invented during the past 28 years, and
it seems unlikely that adding a new one to
the repertoire will lead to an upsurge in discrimination against offspring created by
cloning. Although there are concerns about
treating offspring as objects instead of
humans, this is relevant not only for offspring created through ARTs—which in the
future might include cloning—but also for
offspring conceived in the old-fashioned
way. Thus, our focus should be on obligations towards those whom we create, not on
how they were created.

…our focus should be on
obligations towards those
whom we create, not on how
they were created
We should refrain from making assumptions that the means by which one was conceived or the conditions into which one is
born entail anything about what sort of
people they will become or how we should
treat them. As humans, we should make use
of our unique capacity for moral agency, in
particular our capacity to have and fulfil
obligations. As Kant put it, the very act of
bringing another person into existence
means that parents have an obligation “to
make their children—as far as their power
goes—as contented with the condition thus
acquired” (Kant, 1790). Treating clones as
inferior to other humans is still safely in the
realm of fiction, and it should stay that way.
Fortunately, it is well within our grasp to
ensure that it does.
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